On the morning of May 9, while Russian tanks were absent from the military parade in Red Square due to fears of Ukrainian drone attacks, Kremlin propaganda marched undisturbed through the Albanian media space.<\/p>\n
Online media outlets and television stations – citing the TASS and RIA Novosti news agencies – relayed, almost in real time, the messages delivered by Vladimir Putin in his speech, in which he emphasized the \u201cjust war\u201d in Ukraine, the \u201caggressive force of NATO,\u201d and the continuation of the battle against Nazism.<\/p>\n
From headlines such as \u201cPutin Takes a Swipe at NATO During Victory Day Parade\u201d to reports on Moscow\u2019s symbolic ceasefire during the May 9 celebrations, major Albanian media outlets recycled the Russian narrative that Moscow is not waging a war of aggression against Kyiv, but rather a historic battle against \u201cNazism.\u201d<\/p>\n
This is not an isolated case. Data analyzed by BIRN show that articles from Russian state media outlets – such as RIA Novosti, TASS, RT, and Sputnik – are routinely republished online, opening a back door for Russian propaganda and disinformation into Albania\u2019s information space.<\/p>\n
Moscow uses a range of communication channels to spread propaganda and disinformation in Albanian – from the official social media accounts of the Russian Embassy in Tirana, to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets, and even the automated publishing network \u201cPravda,\u201d also known as Portal Kombat.<\/p>\n
\u201cThere are many easily identifiable cases where Russian narratives are amplified by various news portals,\u201d said Erlis \u00c7ela, a communications lecturer at the Western Balkans University (WBU) in Tirana, stressing that some journalists and media managers are not fully aware of the consequences of this phenomenon.<\/p>\n
\u201cThere is a lack of sufficient awareness to exercise even a minimum level of caution, so that false or propagandistic narratives produced and distributed by Russian sources do not reach the Albanian public with the \u2018help\u2019 of local media,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n
Russian state media<\/strong><\/p>\n Russian state media outlets such as RT, Sputnik, RIA Novosti and TASS play a central role in promoting Kremlin narratives and spreading disinformation aimed at destabilising Western democracies by undermining public trust in institutions.<\/p>\n These outlets publish content in multiple languages – including English, French and Arabic – but not in Albanian. In the Balkans, Russia has invested directly in Serbian-language media through local editions of Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, while in Albania its influence is exercised mainly indirectly, through the amplification of narratives by local actors and online ecosystems.<\/p>\n These narratives circulate in the Albanian media space largely through quotations, translations and recycled content from local portals, television stations, social media pages and automated publishing networks such as \u201cPortal Kombat.\u201d<\/p>\n Using the Sentione application, BIRN analysed publications by major Albanian media outlets over a one-year period and identified at least 1,558 articles citing Russian state media.<\/p>\n The findings suggest that Albania\u2019s information space is exposed to Kremlin-linked narratives mainly through the recycling of news reports and statements originating from Russian state sources or actors close to Moscow.<\/p>\n Among the most frequently cited or recycled Russian state media outlets was the TASS news agency with 709 publications, followed by RT with 531 publications, RIA Novosti with 290 publications and Sputnik with 91 publications.<\/p>\n \u201cFirst, we need to understand that these media channels do not enjoy editorial freedom and are entirely under the control of political power,\u201d said Erlis \u00c7ela.<\/p>\n \u201cThat makes them instruments of propaganda rather than sources of information grounded in the accepted norms of professional journalism,\u201d he added, stressing that this reality has been documented in numerous reports by prestigious organisations monitoring media freedom worldwide.<\/p>\n According to \u00c7ela, republishing news or content produced by these outlets is unhealthy for public information.<\/p>\n \u201cJournalists and media outlets that do this, especially without any explanatory note or contextualisation, risk falling victim to Kremlin propaganda strategies and, unknowingly, serving the objectives of the Russian propaganda machine,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n Among Russian officials most frequently cited in the analysed publications, Vladimir Putin dominated with 573 mentions, reflecting the centralisation of Russian propaganda around the figure of the Russian president and his statements on Ukraine, NATO and the West.<\/p>\n He was followed by Sergey Lavrov with 119 mentions and Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova with 82 mentions. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also appeared frequently with 67 mentions, as did former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev with 41 mentions.<\/p>\n The dominant narrative emerging from the data portrays Russia as a power besieged by the West and NATO, engaged in a \u201cdefensive\u201d or \u201chistoric\u201d war against Nazism and Western aggression.<\/p>\n Another strong element is the personalisation of the conflict through figures such as Putin, Trump and Zelensky.<\/p>\n Putin is often portrayed as a strong leader standing up to the West, while Trump is used as a figure amplifying divisions within the Western camp and exposing the fragility of Euro-Atlantic unity. In many cases, the narratives are not overtly pro-Russian, but rather anti-Western, seeking to fuel distrust toward NATO, the EU and democratic institutions.<\/p>\n The data suggest that Russian propaganda in Albanian functions largely through \u201cmedia recycling,\u201d whereby Albanian media outlets reproduce statements, headlines or stories from sources such as TASS, RIA Novosti, Sputnik and RT without verification or critical context.<\/p>\n This creates a normalising effect, where Kremlin narratives appear as routine international reporting rather than part of a broader information influence strategy.<\/p>\n According to communications expert and journalist Viola Keta, \u201cmedia recycling\u201d is a process of \u201crepackaging\u201d information that begins with the use of content \u2014 articles, images or videos \u2014 mainly originating from large international media outlets.<\/p>\n \u201cThese materials are then adapted, translated and republished by local media, but the main problem lies in the lack of verification, critical analysis and editorial filtering of both the content and its context,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n Keta explained that repackaged materials circulate continuously within information spaces and online platforms, potentially serving as channels for the spread of narratives promoted by hostile actors acting against the public interest.<\/p>\n \u201cThis phenomenon is linked not only to the logic of informational \u2018fast food\u2019 and the race for clicks through fast and unverified news, but also to the lack of human resources, editorial capacity and expertise within newsrooms,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n \u201cIn some cases, the deliberate use of such narratives for specific interests cannot be ruled out either,\u201d Keta added.<\/p>\n Isa Myzyraj, head of the Association of Albanian Journalists, AJA, also expressed concern about the circulation of Russian narratives in Albania\u2019s media space, linking the phenomenon to a lack of human and financial resources.<\/p>\n \u201cAlbanian media today operates in a very small market, under extreme pressure for clicks, speed and mass content production,\u201d he said, adding that many newsrooms no longer maintain proper structures for verifying international information, let alone foreign correspondents, and often rely on translations from foreign media, social networks or dubious portals.<\/p>\n \u201cThis creates ideal conditions for foreign disinformation narratives \u2014 whether political, geopolitical or propagandistic \u2014 to enter the Albanian media ecosystem almost entirely without editorial filtering,\u201d he stressed.<\/p>\n According to Myzyraj, Albania\u2019s information space also suffers from an expertise gap, since covering international affairs requires an understanding of context, global actors, propaganda mechanisms and the ways modern disinformation operates.<\/p>\n \u201cIn many cases, Albanian journalists are overloaded, reporting simultaneously on multiple fields, and lack the time or professional support to carry out in-depth verification of information,\u201d he said, adding that this is a consequence of the Albanian media\u2019s economic model, where quantity often takes precedence over quality.<\/p>\n \u201cThe pressure to publish as many stories as possible has had a direct impact on the decline of editorial standards,\u201d Myzyraj said. \u201cToday, many media outlets are measured by the number of clicks rather than the quality of their reporting,\u201d he stressed.<\/p>\n Diplomatic disinformation<\/strong><\/p>\n Russian propaganda messages in Albania are also disseminated through the official social media channels of the Russian Embassy in Tirana.<\/p>\n An analysis of Facebook interactions with content published by the Russian Embassy\u2019s official page in Albania over the past 12 months shows a high level of engagement from its online followers.<\/p>\n In total, 4,232 posts generated 90,038 interactions, dominated by \u201clikes\u201d with 64,169 reactions, followed by 8,387 comments and 7,028 positive \u201clove\u201d reactions.<\/p>\n The data also show a significant level of emotional and polarising reactions, including 5,569 \u201claugh\u201d reactions and 554 \u201cangry\u201d reactions.<\/p>\n Unlike Facebook, audience engagement on platform X \u2014 formerly Twitter \u2014 has been limited for the Russian Embassy in Tirana, with only 72 reposts during the same period.<\/p>\n The content analysis shows that the Embassy\u2019s Facebook page has served as an active channel for distributing political and historical messages aligned with the Kremlin\u2019s official line, combining geopolitical propaganda with cultural and diplomatic content.<\/p>\n A significant share of the posts focused on World War II and the May 9 celebrations, portraying Russia as the main force that saved Europe from Nazism, while criticism of Moscow was framed as either \u201chistorical falsification\u201d or \u201cRussophobia.\u201d These posts frequently employ emotional and polarising language aimed at creating a divide between a \u201chostile West\u201d and Russia as the defender of historical and moral values.<\/p>\n Alongside historical narratives, the embassy has consistently promoted messages legitimising Russian foreign policy and minimising Moscow\u2019s responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Instead of using the term \u201cinvasion,\u201d posts employ formulations such as \u201cspecial military operation,\u201d while NATO and the United States are portrayed as destabilising forces in Europe.<\/p>\n According to Viola Keta, the Russian Embassy has taken an active role in spreading propaganda through its social media channels following Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, amplifying narratives aimed at normalising Kremlin policies, justifying the war and blaming Ukraine for the conflict.<\/p>\n \u201cGoing beyond the traditional framework of diplomacy, the embassy uses social media platforms to promote narratives against NATO, the European Union and other actors opposing Russia\u2019s repressive and expansionist policies,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n \u201cThese messages are then amplified by various media outlets and online profiles, creating confusion, doubt and polarisation in public opinion, while also fuelling distrust toward democratic institutions,\u201d Keta added.<\/p>\n Portal Kombat or the \u201cPravda\u201d Network<\/strong><\/p>\n The third pillar of Russian propaganda and disinformation in Albania takes shape through the automated news publishing network \u201cPortal Kombat,\u201d also known as the Pravda network.<\/p>\n The Pravda network, or Portal Kombat, is a dense and automated ecosystem of online websites designed to publish content that promotes Kremlin narratives.<\/p>\n In Albanian, the network has targeted Albanian-speaking audiences by publishing around 5,000 articles through the website albania.news-pravda.com. The site relies on seven Telegram accounts and three Russian media outlets as sources of information.<\/p>\n Pravda – translated as \u201cThe Truth\u201d – is a network of portals created to reproduce automatically translated content from pro-Kremlin sources in multiple languages, with the aim of spreading anti-Western narratives. The platform became active in 2023, initially in a few major languages, before expanding in 2024 into 19 European countries, including Albania.<\/p>\n Most of the articles published by the site focus on international news, the war in Ukraine, Russia and NATO. According to an analysis by DFRLab, only 3.8 percent of its published content relates specifically to Albania.<\/p>\n The network\u2019s primary objective is to influence the content of large language models (LLMs) used in artificial intelligence systems and to serve as a reference source for spreading disinformation on Wikipedia and social media platforms such as X.<\/p>\n \u201cThis is a real risk, especially now that artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly present in the media and information environment,\u201d said Erlis \u00c7ela of WBU.<\/p>\n \u201cJournalists are already making widespread use of AI tools, and this increases the risk that these technologies could become intermediaries for the dissemination of false information or propaganda produced by automated networks,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n Viola Keta also expressed concern about the network\u2019s potential influence. According to her, Albania remains a country with a clear pro-NATO and pro-EU orientation, yet pro-Kremlin networks have still managed to establish influence within the Albanian information ecosystem.<\/p>\n \u201cThis is linked to the way modern disinformation mechanisms function: the constant repetition of narratives, their amplification through social networks, the automation of publications and the use of artificial intelligence to generate sensationalist content,\u201d she said, adding that these methods enable networks such as Pravda Albania to rapidly reach large audiences and create continuous exposure to propaganda narratives.<\/p>\n \u201cEven if their impact is not always immediate, they pose a long-term threat to the quality of public debate, trust in institutions and democratic stability in Albania and across the region,\u201d she warned.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On the morning of May 9, while Russian tanks were absent from the military parade in Red Square due to fears of Ukrainian drone attacks, Kremlin propaganda marched undisturbed through the Albanian media space. Online media outlets and television stations – citing the TASS and RIA Novosti news agencies – relayed, almost in real time, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":118050,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_stopmodifiedupdate":false,"_modified_date":"","_seopress_titles_title":"%%post_title%%","_seopress_titles_desc":"From Portal Kombat to Sputnik, the Kremlin uses multiple disinformation channels to expand its influence over Albanian audiences, finding fertile ground in an information environment driven by click counts rather than rigorous fact-checking.","_seopress_robots_index":"","_seopress_robots_follow":"","_seopress_robots_imageindex":"","_seopress_robots_snippet":"","_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_robots_breadcrumbs":"","_seopress_robots_freeze_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_custom_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_canonical":"","_seopress_social_fb_title":"","_seopress_social_fb_desc":"","_seopress_social_fb_img":"","_seopress_social_fb_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_height":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_title":"","_seopress_social_twitter_desc":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_height":0,"_seopress_redirections_value":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled_regex":"","_seopress_redirections_logged_status":"","_seopress_redirections_param":"","_seopress_redirections_type":0,"_seopress_analysis_target_kw":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"format":"standard","override":[{"template":"1","parallax":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"float","share_float_style":"share-normal","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"1","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"ago","post_date_format_custom":"H:i d\/m\/Y","show_post_category":"1","show_post_reading_time":"1","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","post_calculate_word_method":"str_word_count","show_zoom_button":"1","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_popup_post":"1","show_comment_section":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"1"}],"image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"no-crop","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-715"}],"trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","disable_ad":"0","subtitle":"From Portal Kombat to Sputnik, the Kremlin uses multiple disinformation channels to expand its influence over Albanian audiences, finding fertile ground in an information environment driven by click counts rather than rigorous fact-checking."},"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":{"view_counter_number":"0","share_counter_number":"0","like_counter_number":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":"","tve_updated_post":"","tve_custom_css":"","tve_user_custom_css":"","tve_globals":{},"tcb2_ready":0,"tcb_editor_enabled":0,"tve_landing_page":"","_tve_header":"","_tve_footer":""},"categories":[14930,14931],"tags":[14935],"coauthors":[20],"class_list":["post-118051","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analiza","category-main-article","tag-isa-myzyraj"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/118051","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=118051"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/118051\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/118050"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=118051"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=118051"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=118051"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reporter.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=118051"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}